Emergence and spread of highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N8) in Europe in 2016‐2017 by Napp, S. et al.
OR I G I N A L A R T I C L E
Emergence and spread of highly pathogenic avian influenza
A(H5N8) in Europe in 2016-2017
S. Napp1 | N. Majo2 | R. Sanchez-Gonzalez1 | J. Vergara-Alert1
1Institut de Recerca i Tecnologia
Agroalimentaries (IRTA), Bellaterra,
Barcelona, Spain
2Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona,
Bellaterra, Barcelona, Spain
Correspondence
S. Napp, IRTA, Centre de Recerca en Sanitat
Animal (CReSA), Campus de la Universitat
Autonoma de Barcelona, Bellaterra
(Cerdanyola del Valles), Spain.
Email: sebastian.napp@irta.es
Summary
Circulation of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses poses a continuous
threat to animal and public health. After the 2005–2006 H5N1 and the 2014–2015
H5N8 epidemics, another H5N8 is currently affecting Europe. Up to August 2017,
1,112 outbreaks in domestic and 955 in wild birds in 30 European countries have
been reported, the largest epidemic by a HPAI virus in the continent. Here, the main
epidemiological findings are described. While some similarities with previous HPAI
virus epidemics were observed, for example in the pattern of emergence, significant
differences were also patent, in particular the size and extent of the epidemic. Even
though no human infections have been reported to date, the fact that A/H5N8 has
affected so far 1,112 domestic holdings, increases the risk of exposure of humans
and therefore represents a concern. Understanding the epidemiology of HPAI
viruses is essential for the planning future surveillance and control activities.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Over the past years, Asian-origin H5 highly pathogenic avian influenza
(HPAI) viruses have been responsible for recurrent outbreaks in wild
and domestic birds worldwide and have caused occasional infection in
humans, posing a continuous threat to both animal and public health.
HPAI H5N1 virus was first isolated in 1996 in southern China from a
goose (A/goose/Guangdong/1/1996 (Gs/GD/96)) (Xu, Subbarao, Cox,
& Guo, 1999), and one year later, it caused the first lethal human infec-
tion in Hong Kong (WHO, 2010). Gs/GD/96 has evolved into multiple
phylogenetic clades based on the hemagglutinin (HA) gene (WHO,
2014). In fact, 10 distinct genetic clades (0–9) and even more sub-
clades with different antigenic properties were described (WHO,
2008, 2009). H5N1 viruses were separated into four antigenic groups
on the basis of hemagglutination inhibition (HI) assay: group A (clades
1, 2.1, 2.4 and 8), group B (clades 1, 2.1, 4, 5, 7 and 9), group C (clades
2.1, 2.2 and 2.3) and group D (clades 2.3 and 5) (Wu et al., 2008).
Among these, clade 2.3.4 has continuously circulated in poultry and
wild waterfowl with different neuraminidase (NA) subtypes including
H5N2 (Zhao et al., 2012), H5N5 (Gu et al., 2011), H5N6 (Bi et al.,
2015) and H5N8 (Fan et al., 2014).
On late May–early June 2016, testing of wild birds in the Ubsu-
Nur Lake, in the border between Mongolia and the Tyva Republic
(Russian Federation), was carried out within the active surveillance
activities for the detection of avian influenza (AI) viruses. H5 subtype
of AI virus was detected in 17 birds including six black-headed gulls
(Larus ridibundus), four grey herons (Ardea cinerea), four great cor-
morants (Phalacrocorax carbo), one common tern (Sterna hirundo), one
great crested grebe (Podiceps cristatus) and one duck (unidentified spe-
cies) (FAO, 2016). Sequence analysis of the isolates evidenced that
they belonged to the Asian HPAI H5 lineage Gs/GD/96, clade 2.3.4.4
(OIE, 2016), and was later identified as H5N8. Even though some
dead birds were found, mortality was not comparable to that caused
in 2006 by the H5N1 in the same location when about 4,000 water-
birds died (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
(FAO), 2016). Before the detection of the 2016 H5N8, viruses of the
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HPAI H5 lineage Gs/GD/96 had been repeatedly detected in wild
migratory birds at the Ubsu-Nur Lake (Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion of the United Nations (FAO), 2016). Major wild aquatic bird
migration routes overlap in Siberia, and therefore, those novel AI
viruses can later spread to the wintering grounds of Europe and Africa
during the fall migration (September to December). Overlapping
migration routes include the East Atlantic and the Mediterranean/
Black Sea flyways connecting with Europe and Africa, and the East
Asia/East Africa flyway connecting mainly with Africa (Birdlife interna-
tional, 2017). Thanks to the early detection of H5N8 and a rapid
report by the Russian Federation, the Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion of the United Nations (FAO) was able to raise the alarm in rela-
tion to the risk of spread of the virus to the south and west of the
area where the virus had been detected (Food and Agriculture Organi-
zation of the United Nations (FAO), 2016). FAO’s concern was based
on the previous experience of a repeated pattern whereby detection
of HPAI H5 of Gs/GD/96-lineage in wild birds in the southern Rus-
sian Federation was followed by detection of similar viruses at distant
locations to the west or to the south. In at least three times, detec-
tion of AI viruses in wild birds (in particular H5N1 HPAI) in the south-
central area of Siberia was followed by detection of the same virus in
wild birds or poultry further west and south: clade 2.2 in 2005/06,
clade 2.3.2.1c in 2009/10 and clade 2.3.2.1c in 2014/15 (Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), 2016). Further-
more, in 2014, the spread of HPAI H5N8 virus was also attributed to
long-distance flights of infected migratory wild birds, first from South
Korea to northern breeding grounds during the spring migration, and
then, to Europe and to the west coast of North America during the
fall migration, representing an unprecedented transcontinental move-
ment of an Eurasian HPAI virus (Lycett et al., 2016).
FAO’s concern in relation to the spread of H5N8 in 2016 was
confirmed, as in October 2016, the virus reached Europe. This report
describes the main epidemiological findings of the 2016–2017 epi-
demic of H5N8 in Europe.
2 | MATERIALS AND METHODS
Outbreak data were obtained from the FAO-Global Animal Disease
Information System (EMPRES-i) (FAO, 2017). We have used the term
outbreak for both domestic and wild birds, as defined by the OIE
(World Organization for Animal Health), that is as the occurrence of
one or more cases in an epidemiological unit. An epidemiological unit
means a group of animals that share a similar risk of exposure to a
pathogenic agent with a defined location (i.e., a holding for domestic
birds and a relatively small area where animals share approximately
the same risk of exposure to the pathogen, for wild birds).
The density of ducks and chickens was obtained from the FAO-
Gridded Livestock of the World modelled data for ducks or chickens
(Robinson et al., 2014). Temperature anomaly maps were obtained
from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).
The world temperature anomaly map for a given month is obtained
by combining land and sea surface temperatures of that month and
comparing it to the average values for that month for the period
1981–2010 (NOAA, 2017). R software was used for both analyses
and generation of maps (R Core Team, 2014).
3 | RESULTS
3.1 | Epidemiology of the 2016–2017 epidemic of
H5N8 in Europe
According to the data recorded by the FAO-EMPRES-i, between the
first H5N8 outbreak in the Ubsu-Nur Lake in June, 2016 up to the 7th
of August 2017, 2,067 outbreaks were reported in Europe, of which
1,112 were in poultry and 955 in wild birds (Table 1 and Figure 1). A
total of 30 European countries: Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herze-
govina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxem-
bourg, Macedonia, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the Rus-
sian Federation, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
UK and Ukraine, have reported outbreaks of H5N8 HPAI in domestic
and/or wild birds within this period (Table 1 and Figure 1). In 19 of
those 30 countries, H5N8 HPAI was first detected in wild birds, in six,
the virus was first detected in poultry, and in five detections in wild
and domestic birds occurred within the same week (Table 1).
3.2 | H5N8 outbreaks in domestic birds
Of the 1,112 outbreaks in poultry, 420 were reported in France and
239 in Hungary, the two most severely affected countries. In France,
outbreaks of H5N8 HPAI in poultry were clearly clustered in the south-
eastern region of the country (Figure 1). In fact, 415 of the 420 out-
breaks occurred in that area (Nouvelle-Aquitaine and Midi-Pyrenees
regions). Domestic ducks accounted for more than 90% of the out-
breaks, while chickens represented only 9%. The situation forced the
French authorities to implement very strict measures to try to control
the disease, including preventive culling of all poultry within a radius of
1 km around the outbreaks, as well as outdoor birds of the Anatidae
family between 1 and 3 km around an outbreak, and up to 10 km if
there was more than one outbreak within the protection zone (EU,
2017a). That resulted in the slaughtering of 5.4 million Anatidae and 1.3
million chickens. Among the 533 holdings preventively depopulated,
139 were actually found to be infected (European Union (EU), 2017a).
Other measures included the testing of animals prior to movements
within the protection and surveillance zone, which also contributed to
the detection of infected premises. In fact, 17% of outbreaks were dis-
covered thanks to pre-movement testing (EU, 2017b).
In Hungary, domestic outbreaks of H5N8 HPAI were clustered in
the region of the Southern Great Plain (from south-central to south-
western Hungary), where 226 of the 239 of the outbreaks occurred
(Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO),
2017). Domestic duck was also the species with most holdings
affected (61% of the total), but there were also geese holdings
infected (33% of the total) (Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations (FAO), 2017). As a consequence of the epidemic,
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more than 2 million ducks, 200,000 geese and half million chickens
had to be slaughtered (EU, 2017c).
While other European countries such as Bulgaria or Spain also
evidenced a clustered distribution of domestic H5N8 HPAI out-
breaks, in Northern European countries (i.e., the Netherlands, Ger-
many, Poland, the Czech Republic or Slovakia), the distribution of
outbreaks was much more homogeneous throughout the territory.
In chickens, mortality rate differed among holdings, but often
mortalities over 30% were observed (EFSA, 2017b). Clinical signs
were variable and included from non-specific signs such as depres-
sion or diarrhoea to nervous signs such as head shaking or ataxia.
Lesions included haemorrhagic pneumonia and catarrhal or haemor-
rhagic enteritis (European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), 2017b). In
contrast, domestic ducks infected with H5N8 frequently showed
neither morbidity nor mortality (European Food Safety Authority
(EFSA), 2017b).
Furthermore, domestic bird H5N8 infections in Europe did not
seem to be linked to a specific size of holding. In fact, of the domes-
tic herds affected in Europe, 37% had less than 100 birds, 8%
between 100 and 500, 4% between 500 and 1,000, 28% between
1,000 and 1,000, and 23% more than 10,000 (Table 2). The pattern
seemed to differ among countries. While in some countries such as
the Czech Republic or Romania, the epidemic mainly affected small
holdings, in others such as Germany, Hungary or Poland, it mainly
affected large-size holdings, and in France, the large majority were
either large or small (Table 2).
In relation to the species affected, available data indicate that
69% of the domestic outbreaks in European countries were in
TABLE 1 Outbreaks of H5N8 detected in both domestic and wild birds in Europe between June, 2016 and August 2017, as well as the
month and year of onset of outbreaks in domestic and wild, and whether this first onset occurred in domestic or wild birds (the term same is
used when domestic and wild outbreaks occurred within the same week)
Country Domestic birds Wild birds Total Onset domestic Onset wild First onset
Austria 2 24 26 November 2016 November 2016 Same
Belgium 13 4 17 June 2017 February 2017 Wild
Bosnia 1 2 3 February 2017 February 2017 Domestic
Bulgaria 67 13 80 December 2016 December 2016 Domestic
Croatia 7 11 18 December 2016 October 2016 Wild
Czech Republic 43 40 83 January 2017 January 2017 Same
Denmark 2 51 53 November 2016 November 2016 Wild
Finland 0 15 15 November 2016 Wild
France 420 55 475 December 2016 November 2016 Wild
Germany 94 194 288 November 2016 November 2016 Same
Greece 7 8 15 January 2017 December 2016 Wild
Hungary 239 54 293 November 2016 October 2016 Wild
Ireland 0 10 10 December 2016 Wild
Italy 20 8 28 January 2017 December 2016 Wild
Lithuania 0 5 5 February 2017 Wild
Luxembourg 4 4 June 2017 Domestic
Netherlands 9 56 65 November 2016 November 2016 Wild
Macedonia 2 2 January 2017 Domestic
Poland 65 69 134 December 2016 October 2016 Wild
Portugal 0 1 1 January 2017 Wild
Romania 44 90 134 December 2016 November 2016 Wild
Russia 27 1 28 November 2016 June, 2016 Wild
Serbia 4 13 17 January 2017 December 2016 Wild
Slovakia 10 63 73 December 2016 January 2017 Domestic
Slovenia 0 20 20 January 2017 Wild
Spain 10 2 12 February 2017 January 2017 Wild
Sweden 6 37 43 November 2016 November 2016 Same
Switzerland 0 87 87 November 2016 Wild
UK 13 19 32 December 2016 December 2016 Same
Ukraine 3 3 6 December 2016 January 2017 Domestic
Total 1,112 955 2,067
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domestic ducks, 12% in chickens, 10% in geese, 9% in turkeys and
1% in pheasants.
3.3 | Evaluation of the association between poultry
density and domestic outbreaks of H5N8
To evaluate whether domestic H5N8 outbreaks in Europe were
associated with the density of ducks or chickens, we obtained the
density of ducks and chickens for each of the locations where
domestic outbreaks occurred using the FAO-Gridded Livestock of
the World modelled data for ducks or chickens (Robinson et al.,
2014). Then, we estimated for each country the mean density of
ducks and chicken in the areas affected by the H5N8. The results
indicate that in France and Hungary, the countries in which poultry
was more severely affected, and where the disease showed evi-
dences of clustering, H5N8 domestic outbreaks occurred in areas
where the average density of ducks was extremely high. The mean
number of ducks per square kilometre in the affected areas of
France and Hungary was 187 and 140, respectively, as compared
with a mean value of only 11 ducks per square kilometre in the
remaining countries affected. In contrast, when H5N8 domestic out-
breaks occurred in areas of high chicken density, as in the cases of
Italy and the Netherlands (mean number of chicken per square kilo-
metre 2,135 and 1,816, respectively), this did not seem to result in
extensive spread of H5N8 HPAI (only 13 domestic outbreaks
occurred in Italy and nine in the Netherlands).
3.4 | Sources of infection in domestic holdings
To evaluate whether the origin of infections of domestic holdings may
have been linked to contact with wild birds, we calculated, for each
domestic outbreak, the distance to the closest outbreak in wild birds.
The results evidence that 25% of the domestic outbreaks had a wild
bird outbreak within a distance of 12.1 km, 50% within a distance of
21.3 km and 80% within a distance of 33.0 km. However, there are
also evidences that other sources of infection were also relevant. In
Spain, of the 10 domestic holdings affected, in two, direct or indirect
contact with wild birds was considered the most likely source of infec-
tion, while in the other eight, infection was attributed to having
received animals from the two primary outbreaks (Department of Agri-
culture of Catalonia, personal communication). In Belgium, of the 13 out-
breaks in domestic holdings, seven were attributed to indirect
transmission in markets, two to purchase of infected animals and only
three to contact with wild birds (EU, 2017d).
3.5 | H5N8 outbreaks in wild birds
Of the 955 outbreaks in wild birds, Germany was the country most
severely affected with 194, followed by Romania with 90, and
Switzerland with 87. There were many species of wild birds
involved, in particular swans, including the mute swan (Cygnus olor),
the species most commonly affected with 270 outbreaks, but also
the Whooper swan (Cygnus cygnus) with 62 outbreaks and swans of
F IGURE 1 Spatial distribution of
outbreaks of H5N8 HPAI in domestic (red
dots) and wild (blue dots) birds in Europe.
Box in the upper left corner represents the
density of domestic ducks (birds per km2)
in Europe (from Robinson et al., 2014).
Red squares mark the areas of high density
of ducks in France and Hungary, where
clustering of H5N8 outbreaks in poultry
occurred [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
TABLE 2 Number and percentage of domestic outbreaks affected
by the H5N8 according to the size of the holding for different
European countries











30 (70%) 6 (14%) 2 (5%) 2 (5%) 3 (7%)
France 183 (46%) 8 (2%) 27 (7%) 140 (35%) 40 (10%)
Germany 20 (22%) 8 (9%) 0 (0%) 23 (25%) 41 (45%)
Hungary 15 (7%) 24 (10%) 10 (4%) 100 (44%) 80 (35%)
Poland 21 (33%) 5 (8%) 2 (3%) 8 (13%) 28 (44%)
Romania 38 (86%) 6 (14%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
Total
Europe
375 (37%) 82 (8%) 43 (4%) 283 (28%) 229 (23%)
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unidentified species, involved in 44 further outbreaks. Other relevant
wild bird species were mallards (Anas platyrhynchos) with 91 out-
breaks and tufted ducks (Aythya fuligula) involved in 58 outbreaks.
Interestingly, 47 of the 58 outbreaks in tufted ducks occurred at the
beginning of the epidemic (in the second half of November, between
weeks 46 and 48, see Figure 2) and affected several different coun-
tries (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands and
Switzerland). In contrast, 229 of the 270 (85%) outbreaks in mute
swans, 51 of the 62 (82%) outbreaks in Whooper swans and 36 of
the 46 (78%) outbreaks in mallards occurred between weeks 1 and 8
(January and February 2017).
Clinical signs observed in wild birds, especially in mute swans,
included neurological signs, such as torticollis, incoordination and
ataxia, as well as sudden death. Macroscopic and microscopic lesions
were similar to those already described for poultry (European Food
Safety Authority (EFSA), 2017b).
3.6 | Spatio-temporal distribution of outbreaks
(October 2016–August 2017)
After detection of H5N8 at the Ubsu-Nur Lake in June, 2016, the
virus was not detected again until October (weeks 42–44), when it
was reported in wild birds in Hungary, Poland and Croatia (Figures 2
and 3). In November (weeks 44–48), H5N8 expanded further west
reaching Austria, Switzerland, Germany, Sweden, Finland, Denmark,
the Netherlands and France. December 2016 (weeks 48–52) marks
the expansion of H5N8 to Bulgaria, Italy, Slovakia, the UK and Ire-
land. In January 2017 (weeks 1–5), H5N8 expanded also to the
Czech Republic, Slovenia, Macedonia, Spain and Portugal. February
(weeks 5–9) was the month with the highest number of outbreaks,
with expansion to Belgium, Bosnia and Lithuania (Figures 2 and 4).
March (weeks 9–13) marked a clear decrease in the number of out-
breaks in both domestic and wild birds, which continued in April
(weeks 13–17). However, H5N8 transmission has not ceased, and
between May and August (weeks 18–30), H5N8 continued its
spread, although at low levels, in some specific areas (Figures 2 and
4).
Severe cold conditions are known to influence both long-dis-
tance migration of water birds and movements between the winter-
ing sites during winter periods (Ottaviani et al., 2010). Therefore, we
evaluated whether temperatures may have played a role in the
spread of H5N8 during 2016–2017 using temperature anomaly
maps, which were obtained from the National Oceanic and Atmo-
spheric Administration (NOAA). The world temperature anomaly map
for a given month is created by combining land and sea surface tem-
peratures on that month and comparing it to the average values for
that month for the period 1981–2010 (National Oceanic and Atmo-
spheric Administration (NOAA), 2017). A positive anomaly indicates
that the observed temperature was warmer than the average, and a
negative anomaly, cooler than the average. The results show that
during October, November and December 2016 (Figure 5), the areas
of central Russia, but also further west, up to the eastern European
region were affected by a negative anomaly, with temperatures up
to 5 degrees below average (National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA), 2017). In January 2017, most of Europe was
also affected by a negative anomaly, which was even more severe in
the eastern regions of Europe.
4 | DISCUSSION
In recent years, Europe has been affected by several HPAI epi-
demics. The 2005–2006 H5N1 epidemic caused 356 and 637 out-
breaks in domestic and wild birds, respectively, and affected 23
European countries (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations (FAO), 2017). The 2014–2015 H5N8 epidemic caused only
13 outbreaks in domestic birds and five in wild birds and affected
only seven countries (Food and Agriculture Organization of the Uni-
ted Nations (FAO), 2017). However, the H5N8 subtype, which
reached Europe in 2016, has caused, up to August 2017, 1,112 out-
breaks in domestic birds and 955 in wild birds in 30 countries, the
largest epidemic by a HPAI in the continent, and more than a year
after its introduction into Europe continues causing outbreaks.
Even though in Europe the density of chickens is much higher
than the density of ducks, 70% of the domestic outbreaks occurred
in duck holdings and only 12% in chicken holdings. The fact that the
majority of domestic outbreaks in Europe occurred in ducks may be
linked to the particularities of the production in ducks as compared
to other poultry species, in particular in the case of foie gras produc-
tion. The foie gras production occurs in several phases (EFSA,
F IGURE 2 Number of outbreaks of H5N8 in both domestic and wild birds in Europe by week [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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2017a): during the growing phase, due to its long duration
(12 weeks), and the fact that ducks are usually maintained in large
free-range flocks, preventing direct or indirect contact with wild
birds contact is often not feasible and that increases the risk of HPAI
infection. Then, the fattening phase, which lasts for 2 weeks, is car-
ried out indoors and in small flocks (because it is labour intensive).
Therefore, at the end of the growing phase, a large growing flock
may be separated into many small fattening flocks leading to
F IGURE 3 Location of outbreaks of
H5N8 in both domestic and wild birds in
Europe from October 2016 to January
2017 [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
F IGURE 4 Location of outbreaks of
H5N8 in both domestic and wild birds in
Europe from February 2017 to August
2017 [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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intensive animal movements to different locations and facilitating
HPAI viruses spread.
In contrast to the low mortality observed in domestic ducks dur-
ing the H5N8 epidemic in Europe in 2014–2015, the 2016–2017
H5N8 was able to cause clinical disease and mortality in domestic
ducks. However, there are also evidences that some H5N8 infec-
tions occurred without evident mortality or clinical symptoms.
Preventive slaughtering of apparently healthy duck farms in France
revealed that many of them were actually infected. Furthermore,
infected holdings without symptomatology were also discovered
through pre-movement testing in France or through epidemiological
investigations in Spain. While in domestic chicken, passive surveil-
lance based on clinical signs/mortality may be considered the most
efficient method for the early detection of H5N8 outbreaks, in
domestic ducks, passive surveillance would need to be combined
with some sort of active surveillance (EU, 2017e). Further research
is needed to identify the determinants of clinical disease in domestic
ducks and in other species.
The spatial pattern of domestic outbreaks varied between coun-
tries, with some countries where the disease was clustered within
some areas and others where outbreaks had a more homogeneous
distribution throughout the territory. France and Hungary were the
two countries with the most domestic outbreaks, and in both cases,
the vast majority of outbreaks affected ducks and were clustered in
very specific areas, which had the particularity of having an extre-
mely high density of ducks. In those two countries, the epidemic
resulted in hundreds of holdings infected and the slaughtering of
millions of birds to control the epidemic, which evidences that HPAI
may have devastating consequences for the poultry sector. In other
countries such as Spain and Bulgaria, even though the number of
holdings affected was much lower, clustering of disease was also
observed. In those two countries, ducks represented the majority (if
not all of the holdings affected), and the local spread to other hold-
ings, resulting in clustering, may have been related to the specifici-
ties of the production system in ducks. In contrast, in countries such
as Germany or the Netherlands, where domestic outbreaks involved
mainly other poultry species rather than ducks, H5N8 infections did
not result in extensive spread, even when domestic outbreaks
occurred in areas of high chicken density.
In Europe, H5N8 infections in domestic birds did not seem to be
associated with a specific size of holding. In fact, in some countries,
infections seemed to affect smallholdings, while in others, infections
occurred mainly in large-size holdings. Whether those observed pat-
terns are the result of differences in the characteristics (size) of the
poultry holdings in the country, or there were other epidemiological
factors, which influenced the size of the flocks infected, deserves
further attention.
In the majority of European countries affected by the H5N8,
infection was detected before in wild than in domestic birds. That
evidences that the surveillance systems implemented in wild birds,
mainly based on passive detection, were efficient for the early
detection of H5N8. The mortality observed in ducks, swans and
geese indicated that the contemporary H5N8 was more virulent than
the 2014–2015 H5N8 (European Food Safety Authority (EFSA),
F IGURE 5 Temperature (in degrees Celsius) anomaly maps for the months of October, November and December 2016 and January 2017
obtained from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA): https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/sotc/global/201709 [Colour figure
can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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2017a). However, further research would be needed on how the
susceptibility to H5N8 2016–2017 varies among and within wild bird
species. The absence of clinical signs and/or mortality in wild birds
does not necessarily mean the absence of HPAI circulation, as evi-
denced by the detection, by active surveillance, of H5N8 HPAI in
two Eurasian wigeons (Anas penelope) in the Netherlands in 2014
(Verhagen et al., 2015), or in one mallard (Anas platyrhynchos) and
one European Herring Gull (Larus argentatus argentatus) in Germany
in 2015 (EU, 2015).
It seems clear that wild birds have played a role in the arrival of
the H5N8 to Europe and its subsequent spread to the domestic bird
population (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
(FAO), 2016). The fact that 25% of the domestic outbreaks had a
wild bird outbreak reported within a distance of 12.1 km, 50%
within a distance of 21.3 km and 80% within a distance of 33.0 km
suggests a possible link between outbreaks in domestic and wild
birds. However, the mechanism by which domestic birds would get
the infection from wild birds is not clear. In the 2014 H5N8 epi-
demic in Europe, indirect introduction of the virus into poultry hold-
ings via humans, vehicles, equipment or fomites contaminated with
virus was considered more likely than direct contact between wild
birds and domestic birds (EFSA, 2014). Therefore, biosecurity mea-
sures to prevent direct contact and indirect contact with wild birds
are considered essential to prevent HPAI infections of domestic
holdings. However, besides infection from wild birds, once the
H5N8 infection was established in the domestic population, a signifi-
cant number of new infections in domestic holdings seemed to have
occurred because of epidemiological relationships with other domes-
tic holdings, as was evidenced in France, Spain and Belgium.
In relation to wild birds, there were significant differences among
countries in the number of outbreaks reported, with Germany as the
country with the most outbreaks (194). Some of the variation among
countries may be explained by differences in their wild bird popula-
tions or the level of circulation of the virus, but also by differences
in the intensity of surveillance of HPAI in wild birds (including the
level of awareness of the general population to report wild birds
found dead). For example, Germany accounted for 47% of the total
samples of wild birds from passive surveillance tested in the EU in
2016 (European Union (EU), 2017e).
The most frequently affected wild bird species was the mute
swan (Cygnus olor), but other swans, Whooper swan (Cygnus cygnus)
and swans of unidentified species were also commonly affected. In
2006, around 70% of all H5N1 outbreaks in wild birds in Europe
were swans, almost 90% of which were mute swans (Hesterberg
et al., 2009). Experimental infections carried out with HPAI (H5N1
of Asian lineage) in mute swans evidenced they were both highly
susceptible to infection, and efficient spreaders of the virus given
the duration and concentration of viral shedding (Brown, Stallknecht,
& Swayne, 2008). Besides, frequent detection in swans may also be
related to their higher size as compared to other species, whose car-
casses may be rapidly removed by predators and scavengers and to
the fact that they are frequently found near inhabited areas, which
might further facilitate detection (Hesterberg et al., 2009).
Another wild bird species frequently involved in the 2016–
2017 H5N8 epidemic was the tufted duck (Aythya fuligula), with
the particularity that 81% of the outbreaks in this species
occurred in the second half of November (i.e., early in the epi-
demic) and affected six different countries (Austria, Denmark, Fin-
land, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland). That, and the
fact that 600,000–800,000 pairs breed in Russia and that they
have a migratory behaviour (BTO, 2017), suggest that they may
have played a role in the introduction of the H5N8 into Europe
from Russia. Most of the outbreaks in swans occurred later in the
epidemic, which may be suggestive of secondary infections from
other species. Of the three species of swans present in the EU,
the mute swan is mostly sedentary, and movements seldom
exceed tens of kilometres (Waldenstr€om, Kuiken, & Wille, 2017).
In contrast, Whooper swans are mainly migratory, with the popu-
lations breeding in Scandinavia and Russia, west of the Urals, win-
tering mainly in Denmark and Germany, and the populations
breeding east of the Urals wintering in the Black and the Caspian
seas. In the case of the Bewick’s Swan (Cygnus columbianus
bewickii), there are populations which migrate from Siberia to win-
tering areas in Denmark, Germany, The Netherlands and Britain. A
large number of other bird species have been found positive for
avian influenza viruses, in particular within the order Anseriformes.
However, the role played by the different species in HPAI spread
to Europe, in particular in the case of the 2016–2017 H5N8 epi-
demic, is not clear. Bird migration is a complex phenomenon with
considerable variation between regions, species or years depending
on ecological (e.g., abundance of food resources) or climatic fac-
tors (e.g., cold weather) (Waldenstr€om et al., 2017). There are still
many unknown factors in relation to the role of wild birds in
HPAI spread. They include susceptibility of the different species,
pathogenicity of the virus in the wild bird host, efficiency of
transmission, survival of virus in the environment or the influence
of behavioural factors such as gregariousness.
Ottaviani and collaborators concluded that the H5N1 introduc-
tion, spread and persistence in Europe in 2006 may have been
enhanced by the cold 2005–2006 winter (Ottaviani et al., 2010).
Similarly, temperature anomaly maps evidence that, between Octo-
ber 2016 and January 2017, the areas of central Russia and Eastern
Europe were affected by a negative anomaly, with temperatures up
to 5 degrees below average for those months. That may have been
driven the unprecedented southern and western expansion of the
H5N8 in Europe in 2016–2017. Low temperature not only influ-
ences HPAI spread through its role in bird movements, but also
favouring bird aggregation and by enhancing virus persistence in the
environment (Ottaviani et al., 2010).
The spatial and temporal pattern of outbreaks in the 2016–
2017 H5N8 epidemic had similarities with previous HPAI epidemics
in Europe. In the 2005–2006 H5N1 epidemic, after the detection
of the virus in Russia in July 2005, the virus was reported in wild
birds in Romania and Croatia in October, the peak was reached in
February–March 2006, affecting 22 European countries, and then
there was a progressive decrease in the number of outbreaks until
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the epidemic was extinguished. In the 2014–2015 H5N8 epidemic,
even though the size was much smaller, the temporal pattern had
some similarities: after the detection of the virus in Russia, the
H5N8 was first detected in Germany in November 2014, although
in that case, the peak and the extinction of the epidemic occurred
earlier, in November and February, respectively. The emergence of
the H5N8 in 2016 followed a repeated pattern whereby HPAI
viruses are first detected in Siberia, and a few months later, after
the fall migration of wild birds, they are detected in Europe. One
difference with previous epidemics has been the capacity of the
2016–2017 H5N8 to persist during the summer of 2017 and con-
tinue to circulate at low level causing sporadic outbreaks, and that
raises concern about the possibility of the virus becoming endemic
in Europe. Determination of the mechanism by which the virus was
able to persist would be essential. Possible hypotheses include the
existence of a bird reservoir (domestic or wild) or the maintenance
of the environment.
Concerning the zoonotic potential, while the H5N1 subtype has
caused, up to June 2017, 859 human cases worldwide, with 453
deaths (WHO, 2017), no human infections with H5N8 have been
reported to date. The analysis of the genome of the current H5N8
indicated that this subtype is primarily a bird virus without increased
affinity for humans (ECDC, 2016).
Besides H5N8, within the last year, other HPAI of H5 subtype
has circulated or is currently circulating in Europe. H5N5 has caused
only 17 outbreaks between domestic and wild birds, but it is widely
distributed affecting Serbia, Croatia, Montenegro, Slovenia, Greece,
the Netherlands, Germany, the Czech Republic and Italy. In Decem-
ber 2017, H5N6 was detected in domestic and wild birds in the
Netherlands and Switzerland and was found to be related to an
H5N6 detected in February 2017 in Greece (EU, 2017f). The AI EU
Reference Laboratory concluded that H5N5 and H5N6 viruses are
the result of further reassortment involving H5N8 HPAI and are still
predominantly bird viruses without any specific increased affinity for
humans. However, the widespread circulation of HPAI (in particular
those of the H5 subtype) in animal populations may result in re-
assortments of the viruses, which represents a risk of human influ-
enza pandemics in the long term (European Centre for Disease
Prevention and Control (ECDC), 2016). The recent emergence of A
(H5N6) viruses in China causing severe disease in humans is indica-
tive of the risk of infection of humans with reassorted viruses from
clade 2.3.4.4 originating from birds (European Centre for Disease
Prevention and Control (ECDC), 2016).
Given the repeated pattern of HPAI viruses emergence in Eur-
ope, new incursions are likely to occur in the future. Therefore,
understanding the epidemiology of previous HPAI incursions in Eur-
ope is essential for the early detection of new HPAI viruses, which
may help to prevent their transmission within the birds’ populations
and ultimately to humans.
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